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ABSTRACT
This paper answers criticisms [4] recently leveled
at the Quota Method for Congressional apportionment, and
reconsiders the relative merits of various axioms and
methods.
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APPORTIONMENT SCHEMES AND THE QUOTA METHOD
M.L. Balinski and H.P. Young
1. BACKGROUND: HOUSE-MONOTONICITY AND QUOTA
The apportionment problem is the problem of determining how
to divide the number of representatives in a legislature propor-
tionally among given constituencies. In the united States the
problem is rooted in the Constitution, which requires a distribu-
tion of Representatives among the various States "aacording to
theip respeative numbeps." The issue is to find an opepational
method for interpreting this mandate, and to identify the essen-
tial properties that any fair and reasonable method ought to have.
In a recent paper [4] various properties and methods have been
suggested as desirable; the purpose of this paper is to examine
these proposals in the light:of the problem they purport to address.
Formally, the apportionment problem may be stated as follows.
Let p = (P1,P2""'Ps) be the populations of s states, where each
Pi > 0 is integer, and let h ｾ 0 be the number of seats in the
house to be distributed. The problem is to find, for any p and
all house sizes h ｾ 0, an apportionment for h: an s-tuple of non-
negative integers a = (a1 , ... ,as ) whose sum is h. A solution of
the apportionment problem is a function ! which to every p and h
associates a unique apportionment for h, a i = ｦｩＨｾＬｨＩ ｾ 0 wheret a. = h. A specific apportionment method may give several differ-
1 1
ent solutions, for "ties" may occur when using it-- for example
when two states have identical populations and must share an odd
number of seats. It is useful, for this reason, to define an
appoptionment method ｾ as a non-empty set of solutions. Two dif-
ferent apportionment solutions ! and ｾ of a method ｾ may be iden-
tical up to some house h and then branch, depending on how a par-
ticular tie is resolved. The restriction of f to the domain
- h
a solution up to h, f , and f
The principles that should apply to apportionment have been
intensely debated ever since the Constitutional Convention in 1787.
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From these debates two basic themes emerge. The first, funda-
mental to the approaches of Hamilton, Webster, and later con-
tributors is that the ideal or exact number of seats that any
state i should receive is p.h/2p. = q., called the exact quota
1 . J 1
of state i, and in any case noJstate should receive less than
its lower quota, LqiJ, or more than its upper quota, fqil . Any
method whose solutions have this property is said to satisfy
quota.
One such method, first proposed by Alexander Hamilton, and
used from 1850 through 1900 is the following: first give to each
state i its lower quota and then distribute the remaining seats,
one each, to the states with the largest fractional remainders.
A fundamental difficulty with this method -- which begat the second
basic theme for debate -- came to light in 1881 when Alabama would
have lost seats by this method as the house increased from 299
to 300. This behavior is not only shocking to common sense and
any reasonable notion of fair division, but has proved to be to-
tally unacceptable politically-- as members of Congress immedia-
tely perceived. As Representative John C. Bell put it, "This
atrocity which [mathematicians] have elected to call a 'paradox'
... this freak presents a mathematical impossibility." (Stated
.in debate, 8 January 1901.) For this reason the Hamilton Method
was abandoned in 1911, and the basic principle was recognized that
an apportionment method must be house-monotone; that is, if the
total number of seats to be apportioned increases, then ceteris
paribus no state should receive fewer seats than it did before.
Yet in [4] it is said that, "there is no real reason for
requiring apportionment to be house-monotone. The objective
should be to minimize inequity.
2. MINIMIZING "INEQUITY" AND CONSISTENCY
Intuitively, "minimizing inequity" is what the apportionment
problem is all about. The real problem is to determine what "in-
equity" means. To say it is desirable to "minimize the length
of the inequity vector in Euclidean s-space" begs the question.
Indeed, as pointed out in [4]," All measures ... of inequity
are to some extent arbitrary."
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Motivated by the need for house-monotone methods E.V. Huntington
began in 1921 [8] the investigation of several measures of inequity
based on pairwise comparisons of states' relative representation.
Given populations p and an apportionment a for h, p./a. and a./
- - 1 1 1
Pi represent, respectively, the average distriot size and the
"share of a representative" of state i. If p./a. > p./a. then state
1 1 J J
j is better off than state i. Let T(i,j) = T(j,i} > 0 be a measure
of inequity between states i and j. An apportionment ｾ is in
equilibrium if no transfer of one seat ｦ ｲ ｯ ｾ a better off state
j to a less well off state i reduces the value of T(i,j).
Certain T's admit no equilibrium apportionments, but Huntington
showed ([7] [8]) that others do and that five different apportion-
ment methods devolve from these. For example, T(i,j) =Ip./a. -
1 1
p./a.lyields Harmonic Mean (HM) apportionments whereas T(i,j) =) J -
la./p. - a·/p·lgives Webster (W) apportionments. Huntington arguedJ J 1 1 ｾ
that the most natural choice was the "relative differenoe" T(i,j) =
Ip·/a. - p./a·l/min(p./a. ,p./a.} and showed this
1 1 J J ·11 J J
choice leads to the Method of Equal Proportions Ｈ ｾ ｐ Ｉ Ｎ He was per-
suasive: the u.s. Congress adopted ｾ ｐ as the law beginning in 1941.
Nevertheless this choice of measure of inequity remained arbitrary.
Huntington unified his five methods -- many of which were
anticipated by others in one guise or other -- through a computa-
tional approach. We generalize it. Let r(p,a) be any real-valued
function of two variables called a rank-index. Then an apportion-
ment method M is obtained by taking all apportionment solutions ｾ
defined recursively as follows: (i) fi(e,O) = 0, 1. ｾ i ｾ s; (ii)
if a i = fi(p,h) and k is some one state for which ｲ Ｈ ｐ ｫ Ｌ ｡ ｫ Ｉ ｾ ｲ Ｈ ｐ ｩ Ｌ ｡ ｩ Ｉ
for 1 < i _< s, then f k (p,h+1) = a k + 1 and f. (p,h+1) = a. for i.l.k.= _ 1 _ 1 T
These we call Huntington Methods. For example, ｾ ｍ has the rank-
index r(p,a) = p/{2a{a+1)/(2a+1)}, W has r(p,a) = p/(a+ U, and EP
has r(p,a) = p/{a(a+1)}!.
Clearly all Huntington methods are house-monotone. But they
also satisfy a condition which epitomizes the very idea of "method":
namely, the decision as to which state of any pair most deserves
the extra seat as the house size is increased by 1 depends only
upon the populations and seats already allocated to those ｳ ｴ ｾ ｴ ･ ｳ
not on the vector p or the vector a of seats so far
-
Consider a method 1-1 and suppose that it has a solution
to a state with p* votes a* seats and to a state
- in a house h, while f allocates thea seats to star
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singly, and
allocated.
f allocating
with p votes
state a* + 1 seats and to the bar-state a seats in a house h + 1.
Then the star state is said to have weak priority at that point
and this is written (p*,a*) ｾ ｍ (p,a). A natural criterion for any
method is that the relative claims for an extra seat between two
states should depend only on their respective populations and appbr-
tionments. Specifically, if for some ｯ ｴ ｨ ･ ｾ problem with populations
ｾ Ｇ there are states having p* and p which are allocated, by a solu-
tion of li, a* and a seats respectively, and (p,a) ｾ ｍ Ｈ ｰ Ｊ Ｌ ｡ Ｊ Ｉ then
then the states are said to be tied, and this is written
(p*,a*) -M (p,a). A method is said to be consistent if it treats
tied states equally, that is, if (p*,a*) -M (p,a) implies fh has
both an extension giving the star state a* + 1 seats at h + 1, and
an extension giving the bar state a + 1 seats at h + 1. Any
two states will naturally compare their resultant numbers of seats:
a change in priorities could not but be viewed as conflicting with
conunon sense.
Theorem 1 [2]. An apportionment method M is house-monotone
and consistent if and only if it is a Huntington method.
3. QUOTAS AND PSEUDO-QUOTAS
It is a major defect of Huntington methods that none of them
satisfies quota ([3]) ,p.712).
However, one may arrive at certain of Huntington's methods by
the device of defining "pseudo-quotas" (see [3] ,p.709). In [4],
the "radically different resolution of the Alabama paradox ...
apportionment by a-quota ll ([4], last paragraph, p.684) is one
such instance. The approach is to define p./a = q. (a) as the
1 1
a-quota of state i, with a a maximum (not minimum as said in
[4]) allowable average population per district of any state.
Letting a i (a) = rqi (an, a a is sought for which IS a. (a) = h1 1
(the size of the house). We omit the improbable case of a tie.
In [4] it is suggested that
unacceptable because it fails to
that is easily cured, moreover."
altered quota idea can be used to
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Then, ai{a) ｾ Pi/a or a ｾ Pi/ai. The house-monotone method
which results is known as Smallest Divisors (SO), was known to
Huntington in his. 1928 paper [7], and was described in precise-
ly this way on p. 709 of [3].
The idea of redefining quota in a manner similar to that of
the a-quota is one which is solidly planted in American history.
Jefferson advanced it in 1792 (see [3], p.703).
"EP should not be considered
satisfy 'quota' -- a short-coming
Presumably this means that an
explain EY. This is true. An
EP apportionment for house size h is found by choosing a a such
- 1
that if a. (a) = ｕｰｾＯ｡Ｒ +!}2 + U then IS a. (a) =h (see [3] ,p.709).
1 1 1 1
This hardly seems to commend Ey -- or any method based on some
pseudo-quota notion -- as a natural method to adopt.
Can satisfying quota be reconciled with monotonicity and
consistency? Indeed it can. If consistency is weakened to apply
only when upper quota is not violated, then there exists a unique
method, the Quota Method (Q), which satisfies the three properties
[1], [3]. It is said that "9 uses a muchimore arbitrary and extreme
measure of inequity than E1.P" ([4], p. 685). But the fact is that
9 is not based on any measure of inequity. The description of 9
"that the augmented representatives shall be as nearly as possible
proportional to the populations" [3], p.685) is false.* In fact
the former defines the Huntington method ｾ first proposed by
Jefferson (see [3], p.703), also much used in Europe but known as
the method of dlHondt, and cited by Birkhoff as GO (Greatest Di-
visors) which he claims is superior to Q.
Q is defined recursively as follows: (i) f. (p,O) = 0, 1 ｾ i1 _
ｾ Si (ii) if a i = fi{E,h), E{h+1) is the set of states which can
recei ve an extra seat without violating upper quota at h + 1, and
k £ E (h+1) is some one state satisfying Pk/ (ak + 1) ｾ Pi/ (ai + 1)
for all i £ E (h+1), then f k (p,h+1) = a k + 1 and f. (p,h+1) = a. for
- 1 - 1
i =!= k.
*Birkhoff's example is incorrect. If P1 = 23,500,000 and
P2 = 1,500,000 then 9 first gives State 2 a second seat when
State 1 has 31 seats (not 35).
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4. "BINARY FAIRNESS"
In [4] a new apportionment principle called "binary fairness"
is advanced. This ｡ ｰ ｰ ｡ ｲ ｾ ｮ ｴ ｬ ｹ reasonable condition states that if
q. and q. are the exact quotas of states i and j, and if a i and
1 J
a. are their apportioned numbers of seats, then it should not be
J
possible to transfer a representative from a state i to a state j
and reduce Ia i - qi I + Ia j - qj I. It is, of course, true that
Hamilton's method satisfies this condition. But also, we perceive
the truth of
Theorem 2. An apportionment solution'satisfies the binary
fairness property if and only if it is a Hamilton method solution.
CorolLary. There exists no house-monotone method satisfying
binary fairness.
This is immediate, since any solution satisfying binary fair-
ness is a Hamilton method solution and no Hamilton method solution
is monotone. It can only be 'concluded that binary fairness is in-
appropriate to the problem of apportionment.
5. WELL-ROUNDZNG AND THE WEBSTER METHOD
In [4] Birkhoff introduces a condition he calls "binary con-
sistency," and proceeds to attack the quota method 9 as the only
method--of the five proposed by Huntington, the Hamilton method
and Q--which "fails to have [it]." Here we express this condition
in a slightly more natural form and show that it, in fact, uniquely
characterizes the Webster method in the class of Huntington methods.
Let a be an apportionment and ｾ the exact quotas. If
a i > qi + 1/2 we say that state its apportionment a i is over-rounded,
while if a. < q. - 1/2 that state jls apportionment is under-rounded.
J J
If there exists no pair of states i and j, with a. over-rounded
1
and a j under-rounded, then ｾ is said to be reLativeLy welL-rounded.
This is equivalent to satisfying "binary consistency."
Theorem 3. The Webster method W is the unique method that is
house-monotone, consistent, and relatively well-rounded.
Proof. ｾ Ｇ Ｑ ･ use the facts (see, e.g., [2]) that:
apportionment a is characterized by
(i) a Webster
(1) max
i a. +1 1/2
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for a. > 1;
1
and
(ii) Webster apportionments may be found recursively by
(a) ｾ (e,O) = 0
(2)
(b) if a = f(p,h) and k is some one state for which
- -
Pk/(ak+1/2) = ｭｾｸ Pi/(ai +1/2) . then ｦ ｫ Ｈ ｾ Ｌ ｨ Ｋ Ｑ Ｉ = a k +1,
f.(p,h+1) = a. for i = k.1 _ 1
First, that the Webster method is consistent and house mono-
tone is clear by (2). Suppose it is not relatively well-rounded.
Then there exists an apportionment a for h, with states i and j
satisfying a. > q. + 1/2 and a. < q. - 1/2. Therefore,
1 1 J J
a i - 1/2 > qi = Pih/EkPk and a j + 1/2 < qi = Pjh/EkPk , implying
violating (1). Thus, W satisfies the three conditions.
Conversely, suppose that ｾ is consistent, house-monotone and
relatively well-rounded, but is not a set of Webster apportionments.
Then there must exist populations p, q having M-apportionments a,
b which are Webster apportionments, but
(3) (p,a) ｾ ｍ (q,b) whereas p/(a+1/2) < q/(b+1/2)
equivalently, q(a+1/2) > p(b+1/2). By consistency this implies
that the two-state problem (p,q) has an M apportionment (a+1,b).
But, then, the exact quota of the p-state at h = a + b + 1 is
p(a+b+1) =
p + q
p(a+1/2+b+1/2) < p(a+1/2) + qla+1/2) = (a+1) _ 1/2
P + q P + q
showing that this state is over-rounded. The corresponding exact
quota of the q-state is
-8-
q(a+b+1) = q(a+1/2+b+1/2) > p(b+1/2) + q(b+1/2) = b + 1/2
p, + q P + q P + q
showing that this state is under-rounded. Therefore, the appor-
tionment (a+1,b) is not relatively well-rounded, a contradiction.
This completes the proof.
It should be remembered, however, that in spite of having
this property, the Webster method does not satisfy quota.
6. "BIAS"
The axiomatic approach to apportionment proceeds by making
a choice concerning the principles which any fair apportionment
should satisfy, and then identifying that method (or methods)
that satisfy the principles. The advantage of beginning with
agreed-upon fairness principles is that subsequent squabbles
over particular numbers resulting from these principles are
avoided.
Nevertheless given any method it is an almost irresistable
temptation to analyze particular numerical solutions by adding
and substracting different combinations of the numbers to show
that the method is in some peculiar sense unfair to certain
groups of states. Thus one may question whether a particular
solution gives more than a just share to the IIlarger" states
versus the "smaller" states (or the II middle" states) or to the
North versus the South, or to the states with large fractions
versus those with small fractions, and so forth. These investi-
gations may generally be called ones of "bias ll and they purport
to establish empirically that certain "new" principles are vio-
lated; principles which by the very nature of the case are dif-
ferent from those already agreed upon as defining the method.
For the notion of bias to even make sense, a normative principle
must be postulated; one may then ask what methods (if any) satis-
fy this principle instead of other principles.
It is stated [4] that SD is lI un fair to populous states for
a simple reason: every nonpopulous state 'entitled' to 1.1 re-
presentatives must be given two representatives ... II This can
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only mean that if the exact quota of a "nonpopulous state" is at
least 1.1 then Sp assures this state two representatives. This
is false, as the following example shows.
State populations 4533
Exact quotas 1. 51
SD solution (a =4533) 1
4686
1.56
2
5049
1.68
2
6183
2.06
2
9549
3.18
3
Totals
30,QCX)
10
10
But, in any case, no normative principle is advanced to support
the claim that the numerical example shows bias.
In [4] an argument is given "to show that Q is biased"
against nonpopulous states. The argument consists of comparing
the Hand Q solutions for four 50-state examples, and selecting
- -
from the 50 states in each case a subset of "nonpopulous" states
which Q rounds down and H roupds up, and a subset of "populous"
- - .
states for which the contrary occurs ([4], Tables 2-5).* It is
then observed that Q allots less than H to the nonpopulous states
chosen, and more than H to the populous states chosen. It would
be as pertinent to remark that virtually any apportionment solu-
tion gives some states less than their exact quotas and others
more, and that the two sets will in general be different for dif-
ferent methods.
It is true of course that Q has a tendency of rounding up
the exact quotas of large states more often than those of small
states. This is unavoidable -- being a necessary consequence of
the fairness principles uniquely satisfied by the Quota Method.
If H is taken as a norm for comparison, Q is then "biased"
in that it does not necessarily round up the exact quotas of
those states having the largest fractional remainders. This is
the procedure which constitutes H, so Q can hardly but be "biased"
- -
according to this measure. But H violates the essential house-
monotonicity axiom so cannot be taken as a reasonable norm for
comparison. Birkhoff goes on to propose Ｂ ｾ as a good aompromise
between Q and ... ｅ ｐ ｾ whiah goes so far in the opposite direation
* \The sets of "nonpopulous" or "populous" states are different
and conveniently chosen in each case.
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that it violates 'quota'" ([4], p.685). Thus, according to the
argument of [4], EP is also biased, but preferred to 9.
Setting aside the pejorative notion of "bias," there is a
precise sense in which one can talk about one method "favoring"
large (or small) states in comparison with another method. This
notion is defined in a precise manner and Theorem 1 ([3], p.708)
compares the five Huntington methods with respect to "favoring"
large over small states. But no Huntington method satisfies
quota so those comparisons, while interesting, shed little or no
light on the supposed "bias" of Q.
7. THE ROLE OF AXIOMS AND QUOTA METHOD
The lessons of history clearly point to the necessity of
arriving at a fundamental understanding of the properties of methods.
Put in other terms, political apportionment must be based on prin-
ciples of fair division rather than on ad hoc choices of measures
of inequity. Thus axiomatics ;finds a political role!
In [4] Birkhoff attacks Q for a variety of reasons. First,
Q is faulted because it fails to satisfy the "binary fairness"
property, -although it is ignored that this property uniquely deter-
Mines the Hamilton method (which is not house-monotone). Second,
Q is noted to violate "binary consistency", althoughit is not
observed that this property uniquely determines the Webster method
(H) in the class of Huntington methods (moreover W is not recommended
- -
by Birkhoff). Third, a description of an admittedly arbitrary
measure of inequality supposedly "used" by Q is attacked, but this
measure is not used by 9 (it characterizes Jefferson's method J, or
GD, one of three methods recommended by Birkhoff). Fourth, house-
monotonicity is discarded as having "no real reason," while mini-
mizing any inequity Measure is deemed preferable.
This confused state of affairs can only be cleared up through
a careful construction of fundamental axioms which satisfy pre-
cedents explicitly or implicitly determined by the u.S. Constitu-
tion, its framers and interpreters, and by the members of Congress.
Further, in the words of Zecharia Chaffee, Jr., "the preservation
of a respect for the law will in the long run be best obtained by
the adoption of a plan which is least likely to produce a sense
of unfairness in those who are forced to obey legislation" ([6],
pp. 104 3- 104 4) .
-11-
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